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READING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM
THROUGH THE LENS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EQUALITY
Jessica Silbey*

BILL D. HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT
AND TECHNOLOGY (2013). Pp. 264. Hardcover $ 32.99.
ARAM SINNREICH, THE PIRACY CRUSADE: HOW THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S WAR ON
SHARING DESTROYS MARKETS AND ERODES CIVIL LIBERTIES (2013). Pp. 256. Paperback
$ 26.95.
ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN (2013). Pp. 384. Hardcover $ 35.00.
The three books selected for this book review tell intellectual property (IP) stories
that are familiar to many students of copyright. In The Fight Over Digital Rights,1 Bill
Herman explores the expansion of copyright from the 1976 Copyright Act to its 1998
reform encompassing both the term extension and digital rights. 2 Herman’s book ends with
the demise of the Stop On-Line Privacy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act (PIPA) in 2012,
suggesting that Internet activism may be a game changer in copyright law. 3 Robert Spoo’s
Without Copyrights: Piracy, Publishing, and the Public Domain4 tells the story of the
entrenched protectionist tendencies of the U.S. book publishing industry throughout the
twentieth century at the expense of modernism’s great authors (Joyce, Pound, Eliot, Yeats)
but to the benefit of the U.S. public domain. 5 Aram Sinnreich’s The Piracy Crusade: How
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Ph.D., J.D. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; B.A.
Stanford University. With thanks to Linda McClain, Rebecca Curtin, the editors at the Tulsa Law Review, and
participants of the University of Victoria Colloquium in Political, Social and Legal Theory.
1. BILL D. HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY
(2013).
2. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (1998)); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-05, 1301-22 (1998)).
3. See Larry Magid, What are SOPA and PIPA And Why All the Fuss?, FORBES.COM (Jan. 18, 2012, 10:14
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/18/what-are-sopa-and-pipa-and-why-all-the-fuss/
(discussing the controversy surrounding SOPA and PIPA).
4. ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2013).
5. Until 1989, foreign copyright owners had significant difficulty securing U.S. copyright protection
because of technical formalities (such as notice and registration) and because of the “manufacturing clause,”
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the Music Industry’s War on Sharing Destroys Markets and Erodes Civil Liberties
recounts the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) technology and the music establishment’s attempts
to thwart further P2P innovation because of the harm of “piracy” but at the expense of
further music creation and development. 6
Despite telling familiar stories about the expansion of and resistance to copyright
protection in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this troika of books also
reframes and enriches those debates in important and similar ways. First, the sustained
attention to legal and cultural history within the particular fields of focus enlightens the
student of political science (Herman’s book), literary history (Spoo’s book), and media
studies (Sinnreich’s book). These are no ordinary books about copyright history. Herman’s
book is about copyright, but it is also a book about politics and government. You do not
need to understand copyright to read this book and learn new aspects of legislative
promulgation and reform and how both can dramatically affect resulting substantive and
procedural rights. Spoo’s book brings to the reader the written, personal correspondences
between James Joyce, Ezra Pound and attorney John Quinn in which they debate
copyright, censorship and trade regulation. Spoo’s book is full of modernist gossip and
addictive particulars of early versions of great books (such as Ulysses), escapades of
“literary swindler[s]” like Samuel Roth, and the negotiated details of publishing contracts
and trade courtesies (including negligent business advice and intentionally veiled business
advantages).7 Reading both the Herman and Spoo books feels like taking a trip through a
living history museum where costumed actors and period furniture conjure vibrant and
vital times and places where copyright was critical (the back halls of Congress and the
Lower East Side of New York). Sinnreich’s book, although about the more recent past,
also leads the reader through an intricate cast of characters—music publishers, labels,
broadcasters, recording artists, performers and enthusiasts—who are feathered into his
dramatic retelling of the sharing technology’s evolution from piano rolls, to vinyl, audio
tape, CDs and digital files. Like nineteenth century realist novels, these three books are
bursting with people, places, facts, and chronologies.
Second, all three of these books also share a preoccupation with piracy, but each
attends differently to it as an idea or problem. In Herman’s book, piracy is an evil to which
legislative reform is constantly responding and which, once Internet advocacy takes hold,
suffers from a public-relations problem. Herman suggests that the masses of Internet users
who are the mobilized constituents of elected congresswomen and men cannot also be the
pirates the law seeks to condemn. By the end of his book, he implies that diversifying the
participation in democratic deliberation and lawmaking is one way to break open the
epithet of piracy to discern how IP laws can be more narrowly targeted to address
financially devastating copying while also fostering speech, creativity and innovation on

which required for U.S. copyright protection that the copyrighted work be published first in the United States, or
published in the U.S. within several months of foreign publication. Failure to secure U.S. copyright meant that
works published overseas could be copied and sold in the U.S. without violating U.S. copyright law. These works
were effectively in the U.S. public domain upon publication in Europe. Publishing overseas was often desirable
because it was less expensive, audiences were more receptive, and censorship of “obscene” material was less
frequent. SPOO, supra note 4, at 69-72.
6. ARAM SINNREICH, THE PIRACY CRUSADE: HOW THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S WAR ON SHARING DESTROYS
MARKETS AND ERODES CIVIL LIBERTIES (2013).
7. SPOO, supra note 4, at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and through the worldwide web.8 Spoo spends much of his book ambivalent about “literary
pirates” such as Samuel Roth, the editor and publisher of literary magazines The Little
Review, Two Worlds, and Two Worlds Monthly. These magazines were famous for their
unauthorized but lawful publication of modernist writers who lost their copyrights because
of U.S. copyright laws that did not protect those who first published their writing in
Europe. Spoo regularly refers to “lawful piracy” as that which cultivated the U.S. public
domain, thwarted the censors, and shaped U.S. literary taste.9 Indeed, Spoo suggests that
the unguarded and virulent disputes between piratical publishers like Roth and the
modernist writers and artists such as Joyce, Picabia, Brancusi, and Pound recast these
“scandalous” and “obscene” modernists as celebrities. “It transformed Joyce from
victimizer into victim and recast Ulysses, widely regarded as an instrument of corruption,
as an object of legitimate readerly desire and the subject of international praise and
sympathy.”10 Sinnreich’s book is devoted to deflating the music industry’s “piracy
crusade” by explaining how, in concert with the legal reforms and policies of the late
twentieth century, the “anti-piracy agenda” is profoundly wrong-headed. He says it
“sacrifices constitutional rights, civil liberties, and international relations in the name of
protecting . . . outmoded business models of a few multinational corporations.” 11 Piracy,
for Sinnreich, is a strawman for protecting incumbent interests and aggregating wealth for
its own sake rather than for achieving the social good of binding communities and
enhancing creativity. And, Sinnreich says, when P2P file sharing is considered over the
long-term, it appears to provide economic and reputational benefits for both music artists
and industry organizations rather than cause irreparable harm.
These three books also reframe otherwise familiar discussions about IP in yet a third
less familiar way. Over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a handful of
copyright decisions that many IP scholars lament and critique as unwise and even wrong:
Eldred v. Ashcroft,12 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,13 and Golan v.
Holder.14 Critics assert that these cases misconstrue the Copyright Act and its underlying
policy. With Grokster in particular, the critique is that the decision destabilizes significant
prior decisions, such as Sony v. Universal Studios, that struck the right balance in favor of
technological innovation and public access.15 Considering these cases alongside the three
books under review helps excavate alternative ways to understand the governing principles
at work in these Supreme Court decisions that have shaped intellectual property law over
the past decade. Herman’s book helps recast Eldred’s approval of copyright extension by
twenty years from a discussion about rational legislative process and purpose to one about
the importance of equal treatment: likes should be treated alike so that existing and future
copyrights both share the benefit of the copyright term extension. Spoo’s book effectively
reframes Golan’s approval of the reclamation of foreign author’s copyright from the U.S.
public domain from a discussion about incentives for creation and dissemination to one
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

HERMAN, supra note 1, at 218-19.
SPOO, supra note 4, at 155, 169, 189.
Id. at 190.
SINNREICH, supra note 6, at 13.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
Sony Co. of Am. v. Universal Pictures Corp., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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about anti-subordination and reparative accommodations for the historical unequal
treatment of foreign authors under the U.S. Copyright Act. 16 And Sinnreich’s book helps
to reclassify the error of Grokster, a case that shut down the file-sharing companies
Napster and StreamCast under an unexpected theory of secondary liability, as less about
honing its relation to legal precedent than about the Court’s misplaced anxiety toward
pluralism and amplified participation by diverse communities through organs of speech,
commerce and power. Pushing back against societal changes related to digital
dissemination, the Court in Grokster appears to entrench individual liberty and autonomy
(under the rubric of individual rights) at the expense of distributive justice.
What I am suggesting—and will elaborate upon further below—is that these three
books about copyright law and history help exhume the connection between intellectual
property law and equality. This is a less familiar story, although I am not the first to tell
it.17 There are various ways to structure this story, such as around values of access and
ownership, incentives and progress, or identity and community. There is much more to be
done in these veins, especially as the intellectual property field is only recently—and still
begrudgingly—moving beyond the utilitarian and economic model of regulatory
critique.18 With this short essay, I seek to add to this growing body of literature and point
out an irony and a puzzle: in Supreme Court cases holding that the copyright laws
justifiably cut in favor of ownership and exclusivity (an anti-access result the IP and
equality literature critiques), the Court’s reasoning for stronger and longer copyright rests
on long-standing frameworks substantiating the importance of constitutional equality. This
may be no surprise given that Justice Ginsburg authored two of the three opinions I cite
above as some of the most troubling, Eldred and Golan (Justice Souter wrote Grokster).
Justice Ginsburg is well-known and respected for her opinions applying the equal
protection doctrine (and for her advocacy prior to becoming a judge), especially in cases
of gender discrimination.19 Justice Ginsburg knows her equality law. How then does she
(and her colleagues in the majority) get it so wrong in the context of intellectual property?
These three books assist in the critique of the Court’s application of equality principles to
16. Golan upheld §514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, inserted into the Copyright Act at §104,
which grants copyright protection to preexisting works of Berne Convention member countries protected in their
country of origin but lacking protection in the United States for particular reasons. The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artist Works is an international treaty that the U.S. did not join until 1989. As described
by the Supreme Court in Golan, “Members of the Berne Union agree to treat authors from other member countries
as well as they treat their own.” Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
17. Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in Distribution, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1837 (2013); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO THE GOOD LIFE (2012); Margaret Chon,
Intellectual Property Equality, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 259 (2010); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark
Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010); Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398373. See also Jessica
Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: Intellectual Property and the Rhetoric of Social Change, 61
CASE W. RES L. REV. 195, 236-50 (2010) (describing the anti-hierarchy rhetoric in some of the open-access
movements).
18. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1397, 1398-99 (2013)
(reviewing Julie Cohen’s book THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE
(2012), and praising it for shepherding the “emerging” “cultural turn in intellectual property thinking” which
rejects “the stylized utilitarianism of law and economics”).
19. Some of her most famous recent decisions in this vein are United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
and Lilly Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). When she
was an attorney with the ACLU, she famously argued—and won—some of the first cases to establish the
prohibition of gender discrimination under heightened scrutiny. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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the copyright regulations at issue and hopefully sketch new ways to advocate for IP law
reform without undermining important long-standing equality principles.
I. TREATING LIKES ALIKE: OPENING UP THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS
Aristotle’s foundational principle of equality—that things . . . alike should be treated
alike—grounds constitutional equal protection doctrine.20 We often call this “formal
equality.” It is embodied in the case law as a balancing analysis that demands sufficient
justification for differential treatment of people or groups of people when otherwise they
appear to be similarly situated. “Equal protection” under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution does not require that all people be treated the same, only that there
be legitimate reason for differential treatment of otherwise similarly-situated people and
the different treatment be rationally related to a legitimate purpose. 21 Only when the law
intentionally classifies on the basis of a “suspect” classification—such as race, gender, or
religion—does the court engage in more searching review of the law and become involved
in the details of the legislative rationales and procedures.22 In cases involving suspect
classifications, federal courts worry that democratic decision-making, which is our
constitutional default, has failed a historically disadvantaged group for arbitrary reasons
or is otherwise perpetuating long-standing and irrational prejudice.23 As such, judicial
second-guessing of the law-making and line-drawing in the form of stricter judicial review
is justified.24 But when ordinary economic classifications of difference are afoot, such as
regulations that distinguish between food products or business practices for example,
courts will defer to legislative rationales and even presume the existence of a rational basis
for the discriminating law if one is not apparent on its face.25
Eldred v. Ashcroft concerned the rationality of congressional legislation that
extended the copyright term twenty years, from life of the author plus fifty years (as
enacted in 1976), to life of the author plus seventy years.26 One of the central questions the
Court considered was whether Congress had a rational basis for adding the twenty years
and, relatedly, whether the enlarged term could permissibly apply to existing copyrights
as it would to future copyrights. 27 Justice Ginsburg, writing for seven members of the
Court, held that Congress did have a rational basis for the extension and for its equal
application to existing and future copyrights. 28
The controversy around Eldred has centered largely on the fact that few people
believe that twenty extra years of copyright protection in fact adds any incentive to create
or disseminate creative works, and these are the two primary reasons for which copyrights
are granted.29 But rather than dig into the legislative history as to whether the evidence and
20. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 1129a-1131b (David Ross trans., Lesley Brown ed.,
2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
21. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
22. Id. at 174.
23. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1976).
24. Id.
25. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174.
26. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)
of 1998, which amended the durational provisions of the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (1998)).
27. Id. at 204, 231.
28. Id. at 194.
29. Feist Pub’l, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (stating that “the primary objective of
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factual record supported a finding of sufficient incentives, the Court did what it usually
does in cases concerning the rationality of ordinary economic legislation and deferred to
Congress, saying “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue
the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” 30 This is a correct statement of law and history. And
there was some evidence before Congress—albeit self-serving and exaggerated
evidence—suggesting that the extension of copyright by twenty years would benefit
authors and publishers and encourage both to invest in more creative work. 31 But even if
there was no such evidence, the Court properly exercises its power of judicial review when
it presumes the existence of such facts absent evidence of irrationality or the need for
heightened scrutiny (as when the law targets a suspect class or a fundamental right). 32
There were other complaints about Eldred aside from the absence of a rational basis
for the extension, including the possibility of perpetual copyright protection under the
Court’s reasoning (which would violate the Constitution’s “limited times” provision) and
whether the First Amendment was being violated. 33 The Court rejected both of these
arguments and throughout reminded readers that what it (and Congress) were achieving
was “parity” and “evenhanded[ness],” as if to say, “as long as Congress is acting to
promote equality in the copyright field, we trust their decision-making and, without more,
these other issues do not concern us.” What do I mean by this? And how does Herman’s
book help show how this reasoning in Eldred is mistaken even on its own terms?
One way to understand Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Eldred is that it is about the
class of copyright holders (as opposed to the users of copyrighted works) that must all be
treated the same or else the formal equality principle is violated. Indeed, long-standing
copyright law from 1903 prohibits discrimination among copyright holders, holding that
“high” and “low” art are similarly situated with regard to the exclusive rights copyright
law provides.34 Eldred may therefore be simply an extension of this century-old holding.
Simply counting the amount of times the opinion uses words synonymous with “equality”
demonstrates the Court’s focus on similar treatment. The first paragraph ends with the
sentence, “Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future
copyrights alike.”35 The third paragraph states again that “Congress placed existing and
future copyrights in parity.”36 It then concluded saying “[i]n prescribing that alignment,
we hold, Congress acted within its authority.”37 The opinion repeats the words “alike,”
“parity,” and “alignment” or “aligned” nearly a dozen times. If we add to that the reference
to “matches,” “equity,” “harmony,” “evenhandedly,” and “same[ness],” which also pepper
the decision, we could produce a word cloud that proves the prominence of equal
copyright” is ‘“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
[Copyright] clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . . .”).
30. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
31. Id. at 255-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198-99.
34. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
35. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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protection thinking in this copyright opinion.
Other than linguistic choices, Ginsburg focused on the authors themselves, their
expectations, and their perceived wellbeing. She insisted throughout the opinion that
current copyright holders are reasonable to expect they will be treated like future copyright
holders should new benefits under the law arise because that is what has always
happened.38 She also explained that Congress’ extension of copyright terms ensures the
equal treatment of American authors to foreign authors under the Berne Convention. 39
Personalizing the equal treatment—its present expectation and its future effect globally—
paints this case not about monetary incentives to create or disseminate but about the dignity
of equal treatment absent a good reason to deviate from it as a social value. In other words,
although the decision reads as the classic deference to congressional decision-making
under their plenary powers, Ginsburg’s opinion evoked her continuing mission of equal
treatment for persons under the law. She, for the majority, could see no plausible reason
to treat some copyright holders differently from others (be it current versus future
copyright owners or American versus foreign copyright owners). This was in part because
of the strength of the equality principle but also because of the history and precedent of
copyright legislation. Here is where Herman’s book skillfully intervenes.
Herman’s book continues the important conversation Jessica Litman began with her
book Digital Copyright.40 In that book, Litman explained how U.S. copyright legislative
reform has almost always been the work of only the strong-copyright advocates (the big
six movie studios (the “MPAA”), the music recording industry (the “RIAA”), and the text
publishing industry (the Author’s Guild)). She further argued that captured legislative
process concerning copyright results in benefits for an elite group of copyright holders and
harms to the everyday audience of copyright users and creators. (In today’s parlance we
might call the beneficiaries of these legislative reforms “the one percent.”) Litman warned
that if the past legislative process is predictive of the future, digital copyright (the dominant
form of expression going forward) will suffocate the constitutional mandate for “progress
of science and . . . arts” that requires distribution and access.41
Herman’s book is less of a battle cry. Indeed, it exhaustively describes the legislative
debates and media coverage of copyright reform over the past thirty years. Through the
thicket of details about hearings, witnesses, publication venues, coalitions and media
debates, Herman nonetheless also tells a normative story about the value of participatory
democracy and his belief in its inevitability in the digital age. This is because he believes
the SFU coalition has begun to win some debates. (I question whether sinking SOPA and
PIPA is a legislative “win” without the success of newly promulgated laws that instantiate
the reasons those proposals were bad, but I will accept that their defeat is a step in the right
direction for the SFU coalition.)
Reading The Fight Over Digital Rights, I imagined Herman (metaphorically) taking
Jessica Litman’s hand and following her back in time, retracing the legislative hearings of
the late 1980s concerning the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), the Digital

38. Id. at 200, 206-07.
39. Id. at 205-06 (“Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright
protection in Europe as their European counterparts.”).
40. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
41. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8. cl. 8.
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Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the late 1990s, and then doing a deep dive into the
media coverage surrounding both as well as substantial online communication concerning
the latter. Herman’s book contains exhaustive detail—the real nitty-gritty of coalitions,
debates, and compromises of copyright reforms from our past. The book contains
comprehensive discourse analysis, historical case studies, and quantitative measurements
of media coverage of copyright reform since 1976. Where one might characterize Litman’s
book as a polemic, Herman’s book is primarily about the value of evidence—evidence of
the legislative capture Litman describes. And the value of his evidence reads like an
antidote to Litman’s warning cry.
Through the thicket of details about hearings, witnesses, and back-room coalitions,
Herman demonstrates that the “equality” I have described Eldred as glorifying explains
how the CTEA was a mirage. To be sure, by extending copyright by twenty years for all
current and future copyright holders, a plausible argument exists that all copyright holders
are being treated the same. But that argument holds up only by ignoring the evidence in
Herman’s book (and Litman’s book) that there were very few people who supported the
CTEA. The testimony before Congress supporting the legislation served corporate or
aggregate interests (the movie studios, broadcasting companies, or the publishing entities).
They did not serve the individual authors and creators—the valued citizens and romantic
origins of copyright in the first instance—nor did they even pretend to. Writing about the
AHRA, Herman says:
The motivation for record companies and music publishers was clear
enough; the former wanted to reduce the number of illicit digital copies
competing with their official recordings, and the latter wanted another
source of licensing revenues. Technology companies supported the bill
– not on principle, but because they wanted to design and sell their
products without being sued.42
Herman later explains that “[t]he DMCA was not crafted as an effort to maximize
the public’s interest or the free circulation of ideas online, but as a deal between copyright
holders [not individual authors but intermediaries] and service providers.” 43 The result,
Herman explains, is laws that entrench moneyed interests. 44 Far from treating people the
same, this process excludes from democratic participation those who stand to lose the most
from copyright reform that appears to be choking access to work in the name of the
constitutional progress mandate.
Herman’s book concludes with what he believes is proof of his normative claim:
that earlier reform ignored the importance of equal access to, and equal treatment through,
a deliberative democracy.45 This is because the 2012 reform efforts (concerning SOPA and
PIPA) were more evenly balanced and copyright reform occurred (or did not occur, as the
case turned out!) in a very different fashion than ever before. Herman chronicles how the
historic insularity of copyright reform has recently given way to public and political

42.
43.
44.
45.

HERMAN, supra note 1, at 35.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 48-52.
Id. at 207.
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forums about copyright on the Internet. In previous decades, groups with less capital had
to take their case to the street, which often caused a lack of continuity and strength as the
effort depended on a sustained dedication of time and bodies. Now “[t]he internet reshapes
policy advocacy . . . [and] mitigate[s] the problem of collective action.” 46 No longer may
groups with the greatest funding and political access win policy outcomes of their choice
by maintaining insularity and elite access.47 Because Internet communication is cheap,
facilitates the aggregation and identification of communities of interest, and is durable and
repetitious, it can even out the fight for access and rupture the insular spaces where
legislative reform occurs.48 Herman explains that when the gears of the Internet were fully
harnessed in 2012 during the debate over SOPA and PIPA “underfunded, diffuse group[s]
of citizens and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) scored a victory against . . .
concentrated, well-funded industry group[s], highlighting the potential for online
communication to shape policy outcomes.” 49 Herman is not subtle about what he thinks
the Internet means for copyright reform and political processes generally. It is “nothing
less than a fundamental reordering of the copyright policy subsystem.” 50 The demise of
SOPA and PIPA—proposed legislation widely considered disastrous for Internet users,
individual as well as small or modest-sized content creators, distributors, and technology
companies—is Herman’s evidence of a more fair and participatory democracy in our
digital age, the benefits of which will redound more widely throughout society.
If Herman’s prediction holds true that the power of Internet advocacy to collate and
represent interests of individual people will continue to counter and resist the heretofore
dominant voices of the content industries, we may, in fact, see copyright reform reversing
the trends of the past. This prospect may reveal Eldred’s equality justification for
upholding the CTEA (that Congress was merely “treating likes alike”) to be not only
inaccurate but a lesson in the risks of importing constitutional frameworks from one area
of law into another. Herman’s book demonstrates how the legislative debates and
congressional reasons on which past copyright reform was based did not in fact treat all
authors the same. In fact, most authors were excluded from the conversation. It further
demonstrates how the category of authors to whom the equality principle should apply is
much broader today than the voices and interests represented in those earlier hearings from
the past and about which Eldred was concerned. Authors are not only those who succeed
at earning royalties in exchange for licensed use by established intermediaries, but are
everyday creators and users (or “prosumers” to borrow Alvin Toffler’s coinage) who
depend on access to expressive works in order to produce and participate in our dynamic
and industrious culture.51 Eldred failed to consider these other copyright stakeholders,
despite basing its decision on the value of inclusivity. 52 As it turns out, there is much to
criticize about equality jurisprudence that mechanically recites the mantra of “treating

46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. at 13-14.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 14.
50. Id. at 19.
51. ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 27 (1980). See also DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 62
(1995); George Ritzer & Nathan Jurgenson, Production, Consumption, Prosumption: The Nature of Capitalism
in the Age of the Digital ‘Prosumer,’ 10 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 13, 17 (2010).
52. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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likes alike” without investigating more deeply the categories and their qualities being
compared.53 The just application of formal equality principles often depends on a starting
line to which everyone has the same access. Justice Ginsburg knows this, as the more
mainstream equality cases concerning accommodation and affirmative action reveal. I turn
to this modality of equality now.
II. ACCOMMODATION AND REPARATION: UNDERSTANDING GOLAN AS A CASE ABOUT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Golan v. Holder upholds as constitutional section 104A of the Copyright Act, added
in 1994 as part of Congress’ accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne) and the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).54 Section 104A (enacted as section 512 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)) grants copyright protection to certain
preexisting works of Berne member countries previously in the public domain in the U.S.
They lack U.S. copyright protection and are in the public domain because either the U.S.
did not protect works from that country at the time of their publication, or the authors of
those works failed to comply with U.S. statutory formalities that are no longer applicable.
Section 104A’s effect was to withdraw hundreds of thousands of works from the U.S.
public domain and bring them under U.S. copyright protection for the remaining portion
of their exclusive term as if they had not lost protection in the first place.
Many advocates considered section 104A’s effective shrinking of the public
domain—on which innumerable people relied for education, entertainment, and
commerce—a First Amendment violation and beyond Congress’ power under the
intellectual property clause. Further, the petitioners in Golan argued that, “[r]emoving
works from the public domain . . . violates the ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction by turning a
fixed and predictable period into one that can be reset or resurrected at anytime, even after
it expires.”55 This appeared to present unorthodox challenges to free speech previously
unaddressed by copyright law. Because the Supreme Court stated in Eldred that altering
the “traditional contours of copyright protection” warrants heightened scrutiny under the
First Amendment, those opposing the constitutionality of section 104A argued that it
caused such an alteration.56 In other words, unlike Eldred, more than a rational basis is
needed to justify this kind of legislative reform. The petitioners in Golan learned their
lesson from Eldred. If the Court would have deferred to Congress concerning ordinary
extensions of copyright terms, Petitioners must show how 104A is no ordinary legislation.
If they succeeded at that characterization of 104A, Congress would have to justify the
amendment with a more rigorous record which, the petitioners thought, Congress could
not do.
But they were wrong. In Golan, as in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg imports equality
jurisprudence into her analysis of copyright law. She begins the decision with familiar
53. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 219 (1989) (describing how
law and society subordinate women to men through defining sex difference in terms of power) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY]. See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 123 (1987) (same) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
54. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012).
55. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
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language about “sameness” and “reciprocity,” stating that the URAA gave to foreign
works “the same full term of protection available to U.S. works” 57 because “[m]embers of
the Berne Union agree to treat authors from other member countries as well as they treat
their own.”58 Ginsburg, for the majority, sees the United States’ acquiescence to Berne and
its signing of the URAA as a “reciprocat[ion] with respect to . . . authors’ works.”59 The
Court considers the laudable effect of section 104A, despite its diminution of the public
domain, as a “restoration plac[ing] foreign works on an equal footing with their U.S.
counterparts.”60
But the Golan decision goes beyond Aristotelian formal equality—treating likes
alike—and justifies its reasoning with reliance on an anti-subordination principle. The
anti-subordination principle is sometimes seen as competing with anti-classification
equality (or formal neutrality).61 Commitment to anti-subordination reflects a belief that
constitutional equal protection prohibits state action that reproduces or enforces inferior
social status of historically oppressed groups.62 Reliance on the anti-subordination
rationale, rather than an anti-classification or neutrality principle, therefore allows—and
even encourages—the state to prefer or benefit some groups over others in service to
remedying past conditions of subordination or deprivation. Rather than relying on
concepts of “sameness” and “difference,” whereby relevant differences justify different
treatment, an anti-subordination rationale recognizes the existence and perpetuation of
hierarchy in past or present conditions that reinforce both privilege and stigma. Consider
the case of gender inequality. Under the formal equality model, women and men are the
“same” and must always be judged by the same criteria.63 Conversely, they are “different”
and thus need not be treated the same.64 Neither approach considers how gender as a social
category structures power relations—opportunities for and access to social, political and
economic benefits on the basis of sex.65 “Same” or “different” treatment without regard to
existing gendered power relations simply reproduces inequality at the hands of power
wielded by men at the expense of women. An anti-subordination approach to gender
inequality identifies the power relations instantiated in the labels “male” and “female,”
and asks whether the maintenance of the labels “participates in the systemic social
deprivation of one sex because of sex”66:
The only question [for equality] . . . is whether the policy or practice in

57. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 877.
58. Id. at 878.
59. Id. at 880.
60. Id. at 882.
61. Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Anti-subordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004).
62. Id. See also Reva Siegel & Jack Balkin, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2004) (“Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal
citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform
institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups.”).
63. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 33. See also MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY, supra note 53, at 219.
64. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 33; MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY, supra note 53, at 219.
65. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 53, at 34-39.
66. CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 102, 117-18 (1979).
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question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a
deprived position because of gender status . . . . The social problem
addressed is not the failure to ignore woman’s essential sameness with
man, but the recognition of womanhood to women’s comparative
disadvantage.67
What does this have to do with the Golan decision and copyright law? As Robert
Spoo artfully recounts in Without Copyright: Piracy, Publishing and the Public Domain,
the U.S. copyright system was rigged against foreign authors from its earliest days on
behalf of the American publishing industry. 68 Foreign authors were subordinated to
domestic authors with regard to copyright, which failed to protect foreign authors almost
entirely. This led to profound imbalances in the U.S. in the relative cost of works by foreign
and domestic authors (foreign works were cheap to publish because licenses were not
required). Thus, purposeful market asymmetries skewed the perceived value of, and access
to, foreign and domestic works. The URAA was enacted finally to remedy those
imbalances. It was enacted, according to Ginsburg’s majority opinion, as an affirmative
action the purpose of which is to undo or reverse the harm caused by decades of
deprivation to the foreign market and foreign copyright holders. 69
Spoo makes clear that he reads the history as unfairly targeting foreign authors for
poor treatment and that U.S. publishers took advantage of that inequality. However, he is
delicately ambivalent about the effect of these legal and market asymmetries. He describes
how Samuel Roth, the literary magazine publisher and “repackager,” was accused “of
having the shamelessness of a highwayman but quite without the highwayman’s courage,
since the law grants him a temporary immunity” from having to pay for unauthorized
copying and distribution of foreign authors’ works. 70 Spoo provides significant—and
entertaining—detail about the rabid dislike of Roth and the U.S. publishers who were
perceived to take scandalously free rides on foreign author’s works thanks to U.S.
copyright law.71 Spoo suggests that the U.S.-focused copyright preferences that legalized
such advantages disincentivized foreign authors and limited their ability to move freely in
time and space.72 He also argues that it enabled the mutilation and unauthorized editing of
the original work.73 On the other hand, Spoo points to several benefits of the legal
imbalance, one of which is the informal publishing trade courtesy that developed to plug
the perceived gaps in the U.S. copyright law by negotiating private agreements with the
authors outside any statutory regime. 74 The reason for and effect of these private
negotiations was to cultivate ongoing, unique, and lucrative business relationships with
writers believed to have future celebrity status. Two other benefits included the enrichment
of literary culture through widespread dissemination of the modernist writers, as well as
the avoidance of official censorship to which mainstream (as opposed to “pirate”)
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 117.
SPOO, supra note 4, at 3.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877-87 (2012).
SPOO, supra note 4, at 187.
Id. at 182-92.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 64.
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publishers were subject.
Despite Spoo’s careful analysis of the pros and cons of the U.S. protectionist scheme
for the U.S. economy and literary culture, his language and narrative emphasis suggest
that he considers section 104A to be both legally and politically justified. Reading Spoo’s
book helps us understand that 104A is truly remedial in the equality-reinforcing way that
the Golan decision describes. Spoo spends an entire chapter on Ezra Pound’s idealized
copyright reform in which Pound portrays U.S. protectionism as “an obstacle to the free
circulation of thought” and believes the hoped-for equal treatment of foreign authors by
the U.S. will benefit international understanding and cultural exchange. 75 In other words,
Spoo writes that this kind of affirmative action for previously deprived authors will bring
benefits to the literary society and international politics. Spoo helps us read Golan with
this focus on international harmonization in terms of the twin benefits of 104A: a foreign
author’s revived copyright in the U.S. and better treatment of U.S. authors abroad.76 The
Golan majority says the “securing [of] greater protection for U.S. authors abroad”
accompanies “remediation of the inequitable treatment suffered by foreign authors.” 77
Like Pound’s emphasis on dissemination and free-moving ideas, the majority in Golan
repeatedly emphasizes how remediation of the lost copyright and harmonization of both
foreign and domestic rights “promotes the diffusion of knowledge.” 78 In a footnote,
Ginsburg’s opinion accuses the unreformed copyright law (and Justice Breyer’s dissent)
of American exceptionalism and isolationism, a critique resonating with concerns of
cultural dominance (status and stigma) that animate anti-subordination equality theory.79
Some scholars have criticized Golan’s unconvincing reliance on the financial benefit
of exclusive dissemination as the requisite justification for foreign copyright restoration
under 104A.80 Yet, Spoo’s book helps make clear that many authors care a great deal about
equal treatment and control over dissemination, not only because of lost copyright
royalties, but because of the dignity affront an absence of copyright causes. Spoo describes
how Joyce, Pound, and T.S. Eliot, among others, lamented the unfairness of U.S. copyright
law and fought the system to control the form and manner in which their work was
published and disseminated in the U.S. Joyce sued Roth for commercial misappropriation
of his name instead of suing Roth under copyright law because it did not protect Joyce in
the U.S.81 Pound engaged in utopian law reform filled with compulsory licenses at a level
of detail that would impress any contemporary legislator. Many others signed Joyce’s
“protest”82 “deploring the inadequacy of American copyright law and blaming the ‘pirates’
for taking advantage of it.” 83 Ginsburg’s majority decision in Golan similarly focuses on
the dignity of authors and the anti-subordination value within the international field of
copyright.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 121, 132.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
Id. at 894.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 890 n.28.
Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV. OF
ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1 (2013).
81. SPOO, supra note 4, at 198, 202.
82. Id. at 168, 186-88.
83. Id. at 186.
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Section 514 continued the trend toward a harmonized copyright regime by placing
foreign works in the position they would have occupied if the current regime had been in
effect when those works were created and first published. As Golan states, “[a]uthors once
deprived of protection are spared the continuing effects of that initial deprivation; [section]
514 gives them nothing more than the benefit of their labors during whatever time remains
before the normal copyright term expires.”84
Restoring works to the “position they would have occupied” and “spar[ing]” authors
any further “deprivation” provides foreign authors with protection over works that should
have existed, explains the Court.85 Far from making foreign authors whole (it does not add
all the years that have been lost), the Golan majority modestly claims to raise those
“deprived” foreign authors to the current status of the U.S. authors.86 Like the affirmative
action doctrine in the gender or race context, the bestowed “benefit” on the select class—
here, copyright of foreign works whose protection were stripped or lost under the older
regime—is something that should have previously been conferred, but was otherwise
unlawfully or wrongfully withheld.
Unlike Spoo, however, who describes the significant benefits of the U.S.
protectionist regime for the U.S. literary culture and public domain, the Golan majority is
decisively against the U.S. protectionist regime despite the benefits it provided to the U.S.
economy:
The question here . . . is whether would-be users must pay for their
desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their exploitation to
“fair use” of that work. Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf could once be
performed free of charge; after §514 the right to perform it must be
obtained in the marketplace. This is the same marketplace, of course,
that exists for the music of Prokofiev’s U.S. contemporaries: works of
Copland and Bernstein, for example, that enjoy copyright protection, but
nevertheless appear regularly in the programs of U.S. concertgoers. 87
This quote resonates with the rhetoric of “equal pay for equal work,” the slogan used
for the Equal Pay Act of 1963 that continues to be marshaled in support of the Paycheck
Fairness Act.88 But contrary to equal pay laws, which have no losers except the employers
for whom antidiscrimination policies may be expensive, section 104A causes real harm to
those who have done nothing to deserve it. The public, who rely on the stability and
existence of public domain material, are now forced to pay where they had not previously.
Moreover, the Golan majority seems blind to the power and importance of the public
domain as a resource relied upon as of right, questioning its constitutional significance 89

84. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 893.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. But see SPOO, supra note 4, at 143, 303 n.148 (questioning whether American authors were held back
by European competition which actually hurt the production and dissemination of U.S. literary works).
88. See Equal Pay for Equal Work: Pass the Paycheck Fairness Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/womensrights/equal-pay-equal-work-pass-paycheck-fairness-act (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
89. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 n.26.
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and describing it as unowned (and thus less protected than property).90 Spoo’s book largely
undermines this claim and persuasively demonstrates how the American public domain,
which was shaped by the publishing industry’s “piracy” of European works, successfully
resisted government censors, cultivated the celebrity of authors like James Joyce, whose
works were otherwise intellectually inaccessible or obtuse, and saturated the U.S. market
and literary culture with the European and expatriate modernist writers—some of whom
are considered the best of the twentieth century.
Golan’s equality emphasis is evident when read against the background of Spoo’s
intricate and scrupulous account of the disputes, power imbalances and trade negotiations
between modernist writers and the book publishing industry. And yet Golan’s reduction
of copyright issues to mere economic incentives and a question of equal pay misses the
bigger picture intricately portrayed in Spoo’s narrative. 91 Both the authors and publishers
at the center of Spoo’s book care not only about equality of pay and bargaining power, but
also about government censorship, professional reputation, legacy, and business
relationships. Golan misses this bigger picture of the indispensable benefits creative work
bestows on community relations, cultural development and political and social welfare.
The anti-subordination rationale is only as good as the benefits that outweigh the burdens.
And, if merely a sliver of benefits are considered as accruing under the legal
accommodation, and the other diverse (and nonmonetary) benefits are ignored or
denigrated, then the legal accommodation could end up doing more harm than good. Aram
Sinnreich’s book about the music industry’s crusade against piracy makes just this point.
In the context of cultural production to which copyright law is geared, he implicitly relies
upon the value of distributive justice in order to fulfill human capabilities. Part III
addresses Sinnreich’s book about this third and last equality modality in the context of
Grokster.
III. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, GROKSTER’S INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A
PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT
Grokster is a case about the lawfulness of peer-to-peer file sharing. From the term
“peer-to-peer file-sharing” alone, we get a sense of the moral ambiguities underlying the
case. Justice Souter first describes the question presented as defining the scope of
secondary liability in the copyright context when a product is capable of both lawful and
unlawful uses by third parties.92 This seems straightforward enough as secondary liability
(contributory or vicarious liability) is deeply rooted in the common law. But the very next
paragraph sets a more nuanced factual stage, describing a digital age where technology—
even infringing technology—serves the public good:
[D]efendants . . . distribute free software products that allow computer
users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks . . . . The
advantage of peer-to-peer networks . . . shows up in their substantial and
growing popularity. Because they need no central computer server to
mediate the exchange of information or files among users, the high90. Id. at 892.
91. Id. at 890.
92. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005).
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bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be dispensed with,
and the need for costly server storage space is eliminated. Since copies
of a file . . . are available on many users’ computers, file requests and
retrievals may be faster . . . . Given these benefits in security, cost and
efficiency, peer-to-peer networks are employed to store and distribute
electronic files by universities, government agencies, corporations, and
libraries among others.93
According to the Court, therefore, values of the peer-to-peer system under
assessment include connectedness, sharing, improving public service, efficiency, and
increased and de-hierarchized access to information and culture. How does the Court turn
an innovative technology with these beneficial qualities into a civil and criminal liability?
It does so delicately, and, based on the criticism of the case, ineffectively. With blunt
reasoning, the Grokster court essentially takes a valuable technological innovation and
makes it illegal only when its use is purposefully illegal.94 The Court acknowledged the
tension involved in the legal scenario and recognizes that there is much to lose should it
draw that fine line in the wrong place. It recognizes the need to weigh:
[the] respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright
protection and promoting innovation in new communication
technologies by limiting the incidence of liability . . . . The more artistic
protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in
managing the tradeoff . . . . The tension between the two values is the
subject of this case . . . .95
Instead of assessing this balance with all its delicacy, the Court turns to a more
familiar and time-honored doctrine of inducement. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary and
referring to elemental doctrines of “fault-based liability derived from the common law,”96
some dating as early as 1876,97 the Court punts on the balance struck in 1984 by Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios98 (which states that infringement is avoided if the device
is capable of substantial non-infringing uses) and instead relies on theories of moral
culpability. Indeed, the Court cites to the famous Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
for the authoritative normative foundation on which its holding relies: “There is a definite
tendency to impose greater responsibility upon a defendant whose conduct was intended
to do harm, or was morally wrong.” 99 The Court confidently holds:
[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to

93. Id. at 919-20.
94. Id. at 918-19.
95. Id. at 928.
96. Id. at 935.
97. Id.
98. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
99. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 37 (W. Page Keeton et
al., eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
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infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting act of
infringement by third parties . . . . The inducement rule, instead,
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and
thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation . . . .100
The music industry would say, “we wish!” to the Court’s promise that Grokster’s
holding will not compromise “legitimate commerce.” 101 Scholars and industry actors have
watched and studied how Grokster (and the earlier major appellate rulings, such as Napster
and Aimster) utterly failed to halt peer-to-peer filing sharing of copyrighted works. 102 And
whether it has also discouraged innovation is contested.103 Some explanations for
Grokster’s ineffectiveness are easy to provide. Grokster sets a very high bar for
infringement by inducement. Proving “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” is
difficult.104 Only obviously bad actors who help steal revenue from its rightful recipients
are liable under the Grokster rule. In other words, Grokster requires identification of
Justice Holmes’ tortious “bad man.” 105 Given this high standard, and the myriad benefits
the Court admitted peer-to-peer file sharing systems create, it is unsurprising that there
have been very few findings of liability under the Grokster standard.
Another explanation for Grokster’s weak legacy is its misunderstanding of the vital
terrain to which its rule applies. To this end, Aram Sinnreich’s book The Piracy Crusade:
How the Music Industry’s War on Sharing Destroys Markets and Erodes Civil Liberties,
reframes Grokster’s factual baseline. In doing so, Sinnreich explains both the failure of
law to halt illegal peer-to-peer file sharing and the ineffectiveness of Grokster’s “bad man”
rule. Sinnreich is explicit about his reframing:
My aim in the first part of this book is to reframe the debate surrounding
music, technology, copyright, and “piracy” by examining the historical
circumstances that gave rise to our current understanding of their
meanings and relationships. This is a necessary precondition if we are
to have a more nuanced understanding of the complex changes currently
taking place within our musical cultures and industries . . . as digital
networked technologies continue to grow in power and scope.106
The nuanced understanding that Sinnreich foreshadows is rooted in a capabilities
approach to legal regulation whereby a just legal system assures human dignity by
providing in relatively equal terms the building blocks of social, political and economic
100. Id. at 936-37.
101. Id. at 915-16.
102. Rebecca Giblin, Physical World Assumptions and Software World Realities (and Why There are More
P2P Software Providers than Ever Before), 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57 (2012); Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates
(Still) Won’t Behave Regulating P2P In the Decade after Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565 (2009).
103. Peter S. Menell, Indirect Copyright Liability and Technological Innovation, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 375
(2009).
104. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 915.
105. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
106. SINNREICH, supra note 6, at 15.
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welfare. Grokster may have acknowledged the social and political benefits to digital
sharing in its introductory factual background for the case, and it may have asserted that
its holding sufficiently accounts for the fragile balance between protecting commercial
interests and promoting disruptive innovation inherent in the concession of factual
complexity. Thus, Grokster accepts as part of its calculation of whether and how secondary
liability should attach the importance of distributive justice, e.g., the “sharing” of benefits
and burdens wrought by the revolutionary nature of the digital age. Despite this, Grokster’s
nod to distributive justice is fruitless absent a more accurate and grounded understanding
of the benefits and burdens distributed—the very substance of that which enables human
flourishing. As with Ginsburg’s invocation of Aristotelian equality in Eldred and of antisubordination equality theory in Golan, Souter’s justification of the Court’s holding
defining secondary liability against a backdrop of distributive justice is incongruous
without attending to the diversity and breadth of uses, values and contours of existing and
evolving digital systems that rely on file sharing.
For Sinnreich, the music industry’s “war on sharing” failed despite the collection of
legal rules that prohibit infringement because music (and human expression more
generally) is:
[An] aspect[] of human consciousness . . . [that is] central to human
evolution [and] remains vital to our cognitive and social processes . . . .
In short, music isn’t just something we manufacture, like cars and shoes;
it’s something that shaped us as a species, and continues to shape each
of us as individuals throughout our lives. 107
If this is true (and Sinnreich cites to enough music theorists and biologists to be
sufficiently convincing), then Grokster and the piracy crusades failed to crush unlawful
digital file sharing because you cannot be a “bad man” if sharing music is a form of
expression and social glue essential to humanity’s wellbeing. In this context, Sinnreich
asks this provocative question:
If a pirate in Cicero’s day was the “enemy of all,” a malevolent agent
exploiting the vulnerabilities of the weak and the outer boundaries of
sovereignty in the interest of personal profit, consider who best fits that
description today. Is it one of the tens of thousands of Americans who
have been prosecuted for sharing songs with one another via LimeWire
or BitTorrent? Is it one of the billons of people around the world who
share music, videos, text and images via YouTube, Twitter, and
Facebook? Or is it one of a tiny handful of commercial enterprises that
jealously protect their financial interests in our shared culture by
maligning, surveilling, bankrupting and imprisoning those who are too
obstinate to acquiesce, too poor to fight back, or too weak to resist? 108
This question inverts the focus of the file-sharing debate but uses the same
107. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 36.
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jurisprudential baseline of distributive justice and capabilities to do so. Instead of focusing
on aggregators and distributors as the critical beneficiaries of the production and spread of
music, Sinnreich explains that music fans (who are essentially everyone) are heroes by
necessity, stealing the bread from the industrial class in order to foment a more democratic
revolution in which, in the end, everyone is better off. If this sounds hyperbolic, it is in
keeping with Sinnreich’s book, which is stylized as much as a manifesto as an academic
monograph.
Sinnreich analyzes the “music industry’s war on sharing” from three captivating
perspectives all to prove the same point: we should not fight over sharing music because
music is a human good. But if we have to, we will, and we will win. First, he explains how
the music industry’s response to digital file sharing resembles the five stages of grief:
denying the existence of a problem; facing the problem with disproportionate anger;
bargaining with opposition in the face of inevitable loss; depression and expressions of
catastrophic defeat; and finally, acceptance.109 Sinnreich also analyzes the issue as a
murder mystery with a turn-around ending that reveals the protagonist as the killer 110:
This narrative . . . positions the steep drop in music retail sales revenue
as a kind of industrial murder, and fingers nearly everyone for the
blame . . . . [With] P2P file sharing . . . play[ing] the role of the butler[]
as the inevitable primary suspect. In truth (spoiler alert), it is the music
industry itself that deserves the bulk of the blame for its own
misfortunes, a fact it has tried its best to obscure by carefully curating
the narrative to emphasize some details while obscuring others. 111
Finally, consistent with the theme of war and violence, in the last third of his book,
Sinnreich describes the piracy crusade’s “collateral damage” and “hidden costs.” 112 These
come in the form of squandered or crushed opportunities for innovative music production,
distribution and enjoyment, as well as the “human toll, measured in terms of wasted hours
and diminished dreams.”113
In each of these sections, Sinnreich employs evocative prose and sufficient detail
that should convince even skeptical readers that the traditional music industry (or “legacy
cartels” as he calls them) must fundamentally change or die.114 Two points here with regard
to the equality framework that I submit are relevant to the analysis of IP law reform. It
seems clear after rereading Grokster alongside Sinnreich’s book that when invoking the
value of distributive justice in the IP context, especially when the goal is “progress” keyed
to human welfare, courts or legislators need to be explicit about the units of welfare being
distributed. Vague or broad-brush gestures to “public good,” “access,” “sharing” or
“efficiency” are inadequate to guide future decisions and behaviors toward the good
assumed. In the context of interpreting copyright laws, Sinnreich attends to distributive

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 56-68.
Id. at 71-93.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 139.
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justice and human flourishing as does the Court in Grokster. And yet many critique
Grokster’s ruling and analysis as unproductive and vacuous, at least as it aims to be either
a technical directive or a moral compass.
In comparison, Sinnreich’s description of the experiences of vast and diverse
numbers of individuals and communities of digital file sharing and of the bargains struck
as history unfolds into the future appears lucid and predictive. To be sure, Sinnreich has
the benefit of ten years since Grokster, as well as the disciplinary flexibility to write a book
rather than a court opinion. But the Supreme Court, being the highest court in the land, has
some leeway too. And, it has a 225 year history analyzing constitutional provisions in
terms of its central prerogatives such as “justice,” “liberty,” “general welfare,” and
“prosperity.” In 1868, the Court received a new mandate (“equal protection of the laws”)
and for 150 years has been working through the meaning of equality as well. It seems a
reasonable entreaty to ask the Court, in all of this experience, to express in a more
discriminating fashion the qualities and values to be distributed on a substantively equal
basis when evoking distributive justice as a rationale. And if not the Court, Congress can
do it. And if neither the Court nor Congress acts, then the people—through their states or
individually—will act, as Sinnreich chronicles, anarchically, defensively, and (he thinks)
guiltlessly in defiance of the law.
The second point is a smaller one, but in a book review that anticipates a larger
research inquiry into intellectual property and equality, I would be remiss not to mention
it. In Sinnreich’s last two chapters, he argues that the “piracy crusade” has harmful effects
on human rights, both domestically and abroad (free speech, privacy, security, and
representative government). He is in good company when making this claim, and he is not
the first to assert it.115 No doubt the “war on piracy” has led to stronger and broader
copyright laws nationally and globally. He provides ample examples of suppressed speech
and asserts that local economies (and therefore cultural autonomy) are threatened by U.S.
hegemony over IP regulation. Add to this Bill Herman’s book, which helps us understand
more thoroughly the positive role internet advocacy plays in fomenting democratic
participation toward more representative government and broader, more sufficiently
distributed welfare rights for those previously left out of the conversation. Sinnreich
concludes in these last chapters that the “copyfight” is about more than just copying: it is
about the formation of new religions (Kopimism)116 and new parties (The Pirate Party).117
He reframes the resistance to the “war on piracy” in its participation in cutting edge
democratic reform, as an example of the best of U.S. culture and values.118 I am with him
on this, but I also (appear to) share his political perspective and his academic disciplinary
training. I therefore wonder—indeed, it seems one of the most important things to consider
if the harms accruing are as dire as he implies—whether this book will also convince those
with divergent experiences and political predilections.
115. See, e.g., MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO THE GOOD LIFE (2012); LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME
W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011);
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property Equality, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 259 (2010); Margaret Chon,
Substantive Equality in International Intellectual Property Norm-Setting, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007); Margaret Chon, Radical Plural Democracy and the Internet, 33
CAL. W. L. REV. 143 (1997).
116. SINNREICH, supra note 6, at 180.
117. Id. at 181.
118. Id. at 194.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/13

20

Silbey: Reading Intellectual Property Reform Through the Lens of Constitu

2015]

READING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM

569

CONCLUSION
Given the speed and efficacy of the Internet, Bill Herman’s book suggests that we
are on the verge of a true revolution in the regulation of information goods, creativity, and
innovation. Trajectories are about to change. Sinnreich’s book asserts this outcome is a
matter of grave importance to human flourishing. And Spoo’s book demonstrates that a
robust public domain establishes rich cultural landscapes despite complaints about piracy
and pilfering. My reading of the Supreme Court cases, as they interpret Congress’
enactments and the common law of intellectual property, suggests we may have a battle
on many more fronts than the economics of intellectual property. The Court’s opinions
importing equality jurisprudence into intellectual property law (where otherwise we are
used to hearing cost-benefit and market-based analyses) have led to gaps and missed
opportunities to “promote progress,” perhaps precisely because of the Court’s confidence
in the righteousness of constitutional equality doctrine and advocates’ failure to recognize
its purchase in the context of IP. Constitutional equality doctrine has successfully
(although not thoroughly) improved the lives of disadvantaged classes and people who
have suffered under state-sanctioned dominance and disadvantage for hundreds of years.
Given this, we may need to engage with this line of reasoning on its own terms in the
courts and also in Congress, exposing it as a potentially mismatched application of doctrine
to practice, or reinventing it for use in intellectual property law and in the communities it
is intended to serve. In addition to being well-researched, richly detailed and passionately
argued, these three books also help situate the new frontier of IP reform squarely in the
(perhaps unexpected) terrain of equality law. They are welcome and helpful companions
into this new frontier of innovation policy.
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